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馬布里訴麥迪遜案主審法官（馬布里訟麥迪遜案）
發(fā)布時間：2023-05-04 14:20:00
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大家好！今天讓小編來大家介紹下關(guān)于馬布里訴麥迪遜案主審法官的問題，以下是小編對此問題的歸納整理，讓我們一起來看看吧。
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本文目錄:
一、馬德里訴麥迪遜的意義
馬伯里訴麥迪遜一案是美國歷史上最重要的案件，對本案的審理給法院確立了一項權(quán)力：法院有權(quán)決定議會通過的法案或總統(tǒng)行為是否符合憲法，即司法審查原則。
其實凡事都有兩面性，雖然因為當時的這件事美國政黨鬧的不可開交。但是同時因為當時的法官聰敏理智的做法，讓美國法律得以重新修改。
因而，現(xiàn)在的美國法律可謂是世紀法律的典范。雖然對當時的美國影響不大，但是對美國未來的發(fā)展還是奠定了一定的基礎(chǔ)。
二、馬伯里訴麥迪遜案英文原文
Marbury v. Madison (1803)（《馬伯里訴麥迪遜案》英文稿）（上）
約翰·馬歇爾文 發(fā)表：選自Info USA/2001年4月；學術(shù)交流網(wǎng)/美國歷史文獻/2002年11月4日轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Just as George Washington helped shape the actual form that the executive branch would take, so the third chief justice, John Marshall, shaped the role that the courts would play.
Under the administrations of Washington and his successor, John Adams, only members of the ruling Federalist Party were appointed to the bench, and under the terms of the Constitution, they held office for life during "good behavior." Thus, when the opposing Republicans won the election of 1800, the Jeffersonians found that while they controlled the presidency and Congress, the Federalists still dominated the judiciary. One of the first acts of the new administration was to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1800, which had created a number of new judgeships. Although President Adams had attempted to fill the vacancies prior to the end of his term, a number of commissions had not been delivered, and one of the appointees, William Marbury, sued Secretary of State James Madison to force him to deliver his commission as a justice of the peace.
The new chief justice, John Marshall, understood that if the Court awarded Marbury a writ of mandamus (an order to force Madison to deliver the commission) the Jefferson administration would ignore it, and thus significantly weaken the authority of the courts. On the other hand, if the Court denied the writ, it might well appear that the justices had acted out of fear. Either case would be a denial of the basic principle of the supremacy of the law.
Marshall's decision in this case has been hailed as a judicial tour de force. In essence, he declared that Madison should have delivered the commission to Marbury, but then held that the section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that gave the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of mandamus exceeded the authority allotted the Court under Article III of the Constitution, and was therefore null and void. Thus he was able to chastise the Jeffersonians and yet not create a situation in which a court order would be flouted.
The critical importance of Marbury is the assumption of several powers by the Supreme Court. One was the authority to declare acts of Congress, and by implication acts of the president, unconstitutional if they exceeded the powers granted by the Constitution. But even more important, the Court became the arbiter of the Constitution, the final authority on what the document meant. As such, the Supreme Court became in fact as well as in theory an equal partner in government, and it has played that role ever since.
The Court would not declare another act of Congress unconstitutional until 1857, and it has used that power sparingly. But through its role as arbiter of the Constitution, it has, especially in the twentieth century, been the chief agency for the expansion of individual rights. (See Part V.)For further reading: George L. Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815 (1981); Donald O. Dewey, Marshall v. Jefferson: The Political Background of Marbury v. Madison (1970).
Marbury v. Madison
Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.
At the last term on the affidavits then read and filed with the clerk, a rule was granted in this case, requiring the Secretary of State to show cause why amandamus should not issue, directing him to deliver to William Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace for the county of Washington, in the district of Columbia.
No cause has been shown, and the present motion is for a mandamus. The peculiar delicacy of this case, the novelty of some of its circumstances, and the real difficulty attending the points which occur in it, require a complete exposition of the principles on which the opinion to be given by the court is founded. . . .
In the order in which the court has viewed this subject, the following questions have been considered and decided:
1st. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands?
2d. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?
3d. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court?
The first object of inquiry is -- 1st. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands? . . .
It [is] decidedly the opinion of the court, that when a commission has been signed by the president, the appointment is made; and that the commission is complete, when the seal of the United States has been affixed to it by the secretary of state. . . .
To withhold his commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right This brings us to the second inquiry; which is 2dly. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.
[The] government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. . . .
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders.
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and beingentrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive. . . .
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights of others.
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear, that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy. . . .
It is, then, the opinion of the Court [that Marbury has a] right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right, for which the laws of his country afford him a remedy.
It remains to be enquired whether,
3dly. He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on --
1st. The nature of the writ applied for, and,
2dly. The power of this court.
1st. The nature of the writ. . . .
This, then, is a plain case for a mandamus, either to deliver the commission, or a copy of it from the record; and it only remains to be enquired,Whether it can issue from this court.
（下接中篇，待續(xù)）
Marbury v. Madison (1803)（《馬伯里訴麥迪遜案》英文稿）（中）
約翰·馬歇爾文 發(fā)表：選自Info USA/2001年4月；學術(shù)交流網(wǎng)/美國歷史文獻/2002年11月4日轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
（上接上篇）
The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the Supreme Court "to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States."
The Secretary of State, being a person holding an office under the authority of the United States, is precisely within the letter of the description; and if this court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officerit must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore incapable of conferring the authority, and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign.
The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as congreess shall, from time to time,ordain and establish. This power is expressly extended to all cases arising under the laws of the United States; and, consequently, in some form, may be exercised over the present case; because the right claimed is given by a law of the United States.
In the distribution of this power it is declared that "the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction."
It has been insisted, at the bar, that as the original grant of jurisdiction, to the supreme and inferior courts, is general, and the clause, assigning original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, contains no negative or restrictive words, the power remains to the legislature, to assign original jurisdiction to that court in other cases than those specified in the article which has been recited; provided those cases belong to the judicial power of the United States.
If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and
original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.
Affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them or they have no operation at all.
It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.
If the solicitude of the convention, respecting our peace with foreign powers, induced a provision that the supreme court should take original jurisdiction in cases which might be supposed to affect them; yet the clause would have proceeded no further than to provide for such cases, if no further restriction on the powers of congress had been intended. That they should have appellate jurisdiction in all other cases, with such exceptions as congress might make, is no restriction; unless the words be deemed exclusive of original jurisdiction.
When an instrument organizing fundamentally a judicial system, divides it into one supreme, and so many inferior courts as the legislature may ordain and establish; then enumerates its powers, and proceeds so far to distribute them, as to define the jurisdiction of the supreme court by declaring the cases in which it shall take original jurisdiction, and that in others it shall take appellate jurisdiction; the plain import of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and not original. If any other construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to their obvious meaning.
To enable this court, then, to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It has been stated at the bar that the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms, and that if it be the will of the legislature that a mandamus should be used for that purpose, that will must be obeyed. This is true, yet the jurisdiction must be appellate, not original.
It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and, therefore, seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction. Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction.
The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to enquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can be exercised.
The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognize certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it.
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future govern-ment, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is, conse-quently, to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental principles of our society. It is not therefore to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this subject.
（下接下篇，待續(xù)）
三、求：馬伯里訴麥迪遜的案情描述及判決書
馬伯里訴麥迪遜案發(fā)生于1801年初，當時美國的黨爭非常激烈。以亞當斯為首的聯(lián)邦黨與以杰弗遜為首的民主共和黨之間的政治角逐白熱化。在1800年底舉行的總統(tǒng)大選中，亞當斯未獲連任，杰弗遜獲勝，成為美國第三任總統(tǒng)。在交接之前，亞當斯利用手中的權(quán)力及其由聯(lián)邦黨所控制的國會，對司法機構(gòu)作了重大調(diào)整，提名時任亞當斯政府國務(wù)卿的聯(lián)邦黨的重要領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人之一的馬歇爾繼任首席大法官。這一提名立即獲得國會批準。但是馬歇爾并未立即就任，續(xù)任國務(wù)卿至換屆為止。與此同時，亞當斯抓緊提名由聯(lián)邦黨人出任新調(diào)整的法官職位，這些新提名的法官在杰弗遜就任總統(tǒng)前兩天獲得由聯(lián)邦黨人控制的國會批準。。在亞當斯任職總統(tǒng)的最后一天，即1801年3月3日，他正式簽署了42名哥倫比亞和亞歷山大地區(qū)的法官的委任書，并蓋了國璽。這些委任狀都由國務(wù)卿馬歇爾頒發(fā)給法官本人。但是由于當時的交通和通訊條件，仍有幾位法官的委任狀未能送出。其中一位就是馬伯里。3月4日，杰弗遜就任總統(tǒng)任命麥迪遜為國務(wù)卿。杰弗遜對亞當斯卸任前的這些做法十分惱火，決心采取措施糾正。第一個辦法就是停發(fā)尚未發(fā)出的法官委任狀。
馬伯里等幾位已得到法官任命，但未接到委任狀的人對此當然不滿，因此向最高法院提起訴訟，請求最高法院對國務(wù)卿麥迪遜下達法院強制令，強制他向馬伯里等人發(fā)出委任狀，故此案名為馬伯里訴麥迪遜案。馬伯里等人的這一請求的法律依據(jù)是美國1789年9月24日通過的《司法法》第13條。它規(guī)定，美國最高法院具有受理針對美國官員的排他管轄權(quán)，可以針對美國政府官員下達強制令。
杰弗遜從憲法理論上認為最高法院無權(quán)對政府下達這種強制令。因此他提示麥迪遜拒絕出庭，拒不說明不送達委任狀給馬伯里等人的理由。馬歇爾接到這一訴訟后感到很難辦，他也知道，即使最高法院同意馬伯里的請求，下達強制令，強令麥迪遜向馬伯里發(fā)出法官委任狀，麥迪遜也未必執(zhí)行，可能導(dǎo)致一場憲法危機。但是馬歇爾就是馬歇爾，他是這樣處理本案的：
馬歇爾認為首先必須弄清馬伯里的權(quán)利是否受到傷害，這一問題若不清楚就談不到法律救濟；如他的權(quán)利確實受到傷害，那么才有可能討論司法救濟。馬歇爾對這個問題作了肯定的回答。他說：“委任狀已經(jīng)由總統(tǒng)簽署，說明委任已經(jīng)作出，國務(wù)卿已經(jīng)在委任狀上蓋上了美國國璽，而得到了正式任命。法律設(shè)定了這一官職，給他任期5年的權(quán)利，并且獨立于行政部門，這一任命因而是不可撤銷的。馬伯里的法律權(quán)利是受美國法律保護的。最高法院認為，阻礙他的任命的行為是沒有法律依據(jù)的，而且是侵犯法律權(quán)利的行為?！边@個分析指明了馬伯里就任法官是法律賦予他的權(quán)利。
接著馬歇爾又提出并回答了第二問題，這就是，如果他就任法官的權(quán)利受到侵犯，那么法律應(yīng)當對他給予什么救濟？他說：“公民權(quán)利的精髓在于公民受到侵害時，每個公民都有權(quán)請求法律保護。政府的第一職責也就在于給予這種保護。人們強調(diào)美國政府是法治政府，而不是人治政府。如果法律不對侵犯權(quán)利的行為給予救濟，也就不再能享受這一美稱了。”馬歇爾對第二個問題同樣做了肯定的回答，認為馬伯里就任法官的權(quán)利受到了侵犯，他有權(quán)請求法律救濟。法律也應(yīng)當對他給予救濟。
根據(jù)上述推論，馬歇爾認為，馬伯里有就任法官的權(quán)利，拒不向他送達委任狀侵犯了他的權(quán)利。但是，是否應(yīng)給予他救濟完全取決于他的請求的性質(zhì)。他請求下達強制令，那么法院就必須調(diào)查國務(wù)卿不給馬伯里送達委任狀的理由，那就涉及到行政權(quán)，行政首長的自由裁量權(quán)，談到政治問題。馬歇爾說：“法院的唯一職責是裁決個人權(quán)利，而不應(yīng)調(diào)查行政部門或行政官員是如何用自由裁量權(quán)履行其職責的問題。這種問題在性質(zhì)上是政治問題，根據(jù)憲法和法律應(yīng)由行政部門處理，不應(yīng)由法院處理?！?span style="display:none">UVp創(chuàng)意嶺 - 安心托付、值得信賴的品牌設(shè)計、營銷策劃公司
但是，根據(jù)《1789年司法法》第13條的規(guī)定，法院有權(quán)對任何行政官員發(fā)出強制令。按照馬伯里的請求，最高法院也就應(yīng)當發(fā)強制令。馬歇爾認為，如果按照這一規(guī)定向麥迪遜發(fā)出強制令，則違反了美國憲法的規(guī)定。美國憲法第三條規(guī)定：“對于涉及大使、其他公使和領(lǐng)事的一切案件，以一州為當事人的案件，最高法院有初審管轄權(quán)。對于前述一切其他案件，最高法院有關(guān)于法律與事實的上訴管轄權(quán)?！瘪R歇爾認為，馬伯里的法律請求顯屬憲法所指的“其他案件”，也就是說，最高法院對此種案件只有上訴管轄權(quán)，沒有初審管轄權(quán)。馬歇爾說，若由最高法院直接下達強制令，命令國務(wù)卿送達委任狀，等于行使了初審管轄權(quán)。
面對憲法與法律的沖突，馬歇爾提出了一個極有價值的憲法問題：一部違憲的國會立法能否成為國家的法律？他認為，憲法是由人民制定的。他說：“憲法要么是優(yōu)先的、最高的法律，不能以普通方法加以改變；要么憲法就如同普通立法一樣，立法機關(guān)想怎么變就怎么變。此外別無他途。如果是前一種的話，立法機關(guān)所立的與憲法相違背的法就不是法律；如果是后一種的話，那么成文憲法就是荒謬的企圖，對于公民來說，限制權(quán)力的企圖本身就是不可限制的?！彼f：“顯然，制定憲法的人們都意在使憲法成為國家的根本法、最高的法，因此，任何理論的推理都必然是，立法機關(guān)制定的法律若與憲法相違背就是無效的?！彼J為，這是一條最基本的原則，必須堅守。
既然違背憲法的法律無效，法官就不能適用它，那么這又必然涉及到另一個基本問題，誰有權(quán)認定什么是法律？什么是違憲的法律？馬歇爾認為這一權(quán)力屬于司法機關(guān)。他說：“將既定規(guī)則適用于特定案件的人必然要解釋這種規(guī)則。如果兩個法律相互抵觸，法院必須決定適用其中哪個法律。如果一部法律是違憲的，而該法與憲法都適用于同一案件，那么法院必然要么無視憲法，適用該法，要么無視該法，適用憲法?！彼J為這是司法的本質(zhì)所在。顯然，他認為憲法是至高無上的、是受人崇敬的，法院只能、只應(yīng)當服從憲法，適用憲法，而且法官受命時是要對憲法宣誓效忠的。由此他得出結(jié)論，《1789年司法法》是違憲的，無效的，不能適用于本案，因而駁回了馬伯里的請求。
這個案子雖然早已判結(jié)，但是，它的影響不但沒有隨著時間的消逝而消逝，反而隨著時間的推移越來越深遠。因遵循先例原則，這個經(jīng)典的判例被引用了數(shù)百次之多，開創(chuàng)了司法機關(guān)審查違憲立法的先河。馬歇爾在判決此案時，雖然考慮了黨爭的因素，但是他的判詞有著實實在在的憲法理論依據(jù)，他所闡述的憲法理論思想影響了美國憲法的全部發(fā)展史。正如大法官弗蘭福特在1955年所說：“自馬歇爾時代開始，并且主要因為他創(chuàng)立的經(jīng)驗，在講英語的法院里都認為馬伯里訴麥迪遜判例是成文憲法的不可缺少的固有特色?！?span style="display:none">UVp創(chuàng)意嶺 - 安心托付、值得信賴的品牌設(shè)計、營銷策劃公司
顯然，馬歇爾并非就事論事地判決馬伯里訴麥迪遜案，而是想通過這個判例闡明他的憲法理論，主張司法對違憲立法的審查權(quán)。馬歇爾的判詞之所以在美國相當普遍地為人們接受，近兩百年來人們?nèi)匀恍欧钏?，也是因為他所主張的理論比較符合美國的憲政思想，符合美國的憲法理論與實踐。馬歇爾之所以能創(chuàng)立此判例，并為人們接受，證明他的憲法理論有著美國人所認同的共同基礎(chǔ)。美國的憲法和政治是建立在三權(quán)分立的基礎(chǔ)之上的，三權(quán)分立、三權(quán)均衡、三權(quán)相互制約是美國憲政所追求的目標。馬歇爾提出司法機關(guān)有權(quán)審查違憲的立法，正好符合這種理論目標。早在1787年憲法制定之后正式通過生效之前，以漢密爾頓為首的聯(lián)邦黨人就曾反復(fù)論述三權(quán)分立的理論。特別值得一提的是他還直截了當?shù)刂v到司法的違憲審查權(quán)問題。漢密爾頓說：“法院必須有權(quán)宣布違反憲法明文規(guī)定的立法為無效。如無此項規(guī)定，則一切保留特定權(quán)利與特權(quán)的條款將形同虛設(shè)。”他認為憲法規(guī)定了對立法權(quán)的限制，如沒有一個機構(gòu)去執(zhí)行這種限制，那憲法就如同一紙空文。馬歇爾在他的判詞中，還舉例論證說，例如憲法明文規(guī)定國會不得制定追溯既往的法律，這就是對立法權(quán)的明確限制。如果制定了追溯既往的法律則是違憲的。漢密爾頓也認為限制立法機關(guān)越權(quán)的最好機構(gòu)就是法院，他認為在立法、行政、司法三大機構(gòu)中，司法是最弱的一個部門，“司法部門既無軍權(quán)，又無財權(quán)，不能支配社會的力量與財富，不能采取任何主動的行動。故可正確斷言：司法部門既無強制，又無意志，而只有判斷，而且為實施其判斷亦需借助于行政部門的力量。”漢密爾頓認為，既然司法部門既無刀槍，又無金錢，對憲法造成損害的可能性最小，由它來監(jiān)督憲法則最合適。他還明確地說：“憲法除其他原因外，有意使法院成為人民與立法機關(guān)的中間機構(gòu)，以監(jiān)督后者局限于其權(quán)力范圍內(nèi)行事。解釋法律乃是法院的正當與特有的職責。而憲法事實上是亦應(yīng)被法官看作根本大法。所以對憲法以及立法機關(guān)制定的任何法律的解釋權(quán)應(yīng)屬于法院。如果二者間出現(xiàn)了不可調(diào)和的分歧，自應(yīng)以效力及作用較大之法為準。亦即：憲法與法律相較，以憲法為準；人民與其代表相較，以人民的意志為準”。馬歇爾的判詞與漢密爾頓的言論如出一轍。漢密爾頓是公認的美國憲法之父，在制定美國憲法中作出了突出的貢獻。然而不知為何，馬歇爾在馬伯里訴麥迪遜的判詞中卻絲毫沒有提到漢密爾頓的名字。但無論如何，漢密爾頓的言論是對馬歇爾所立判例最有力的理論支持。
馬歇爾的判詞與漢密爾頓的論文是美國實行司法審查的最經(jīng)典的理論。漢密爾頓從理論上指出，美國要實行三權(quán)分立的憲政，三權(quán)之間的權(quán)力分配要盡可能平衡。但實際上司法部門在三權(quán)中最弱，因此可以由它行使違憲審查權(quán)。他還意識到，憲法是人民制定的，是根本大法。法律是人民選舉出來的代表制定的。人民的代表必須服從人民，法律必須服從憲法，憲法是人民意志的體現(xiàn)。人民的代表所立之法若悖于人民制定的憲法，那么這種法律就應(yīng)當是無效的。他還認為，立法權(quán)應(yīng)當是有限制的，不是無限的，對立法權(quán)的這種限制也不能僅指望立法機關(guān)自己限制自己，而必須有一個機關(guān)去限制它，他認為司法機關(guān)則是行使這種限制、監(jiān)督立法機關(guān)職權(quán)的合適機關(guān)。
馬歇爾則從司法操作的角度論述了司法審查的必要性。簡單地說，他認為，如果有兩部法律同樣適用于一個案件，而這兩部法律的規(guī)定則是相互沖突的，法官只能擇其一而適用之。問題在于擇哪一個而用之。顯然，馬歇爾認為只能擇憲法而用之，而把與憲法相沖突的國會立法棄之不顧。漢密爾頓和馬歇爾都認為，司法機關(guān)要將一個具體的法律規(guī)定適用于一個具體的案件，必須涉及到對法律的解釋，不解釋法律，就弄不清法的含義，也就談不到正確適用法律。顯然，法官必須解釋法律，并在解釋法律的基礎(chǔ)上審查法律的合憲性問題。馬歇爾則直率地提出：“重要的是，司法機關(guān)的職責是說明什么是法律。”他首次明確地提出了法律解釋權(quán)歸司法機關(guān)的原則。應(yīng)當說，馬歇爾和漢密爾頓從理論和實踐上講清了司法機關(guān)審查違憲立法的必要性的可行性，奠定了司法審查的理論基礎(chǔ)，并且基本上能為美國人所接受，也基本上適應(yīng)美國的國情。正因為如此，雖然憲法沒有明文規(guī)定司法審查，但在美國近兩百年的實踐中，司法審查成了美國憲法的一個基本原則，并在美國的政治生活中起到舉足輕重的作用。
四、馬伯里訴麥迪遜案的告上法院
按照規(guī)定，所有治安法官的委任狀應(yīng)由總統(tǒng)簽署、國務(wù)院蓋印之后送出才能正式生效。當時正是新舊總統(tǒng)交接之際，約翰·馬歇爾一面要向新國務(wù)卿交接，一面又要準備以首席大法官的身份主持新總統(tǒng)的宣誓就職儀式，忙得一塌糊涂、暈頭轉(zhuǎn)向，結(jié)果因疏忽和忙亂，竟然還有十七份委任令在馬歇爾卸任之前沒能及時發(fā)送出去（馬歇爾在給其弟的信中承認：“我擔心種種責怪將會歸咎于我”，“由于極度忙亂和瓦格納先生[馬歇爾在國務(wù)院的助手]不在”致使已經(jīng)簽字和蓋章的法官委任狀未能及時送出），而馬伯里恰好身列這撥倒霉蛋之中。
對于聯(lián)邦黨人在權(quán)力交接前夜大搞以黨劃線、“突擊提干”的損招兒，新上任的民主共和黨總統(tǒng)杰弗遜早已深感不滿。當聽說有一些聯(lián)邦黨人法官委任狀滯留在國務(wù)院之后，他立刻命令新任國務(wù)卿詹姆斯·麥迪遜扣押了這批委任狀，并示意麥迪遜將它們“如同辦公室的廢紙、垃圾一樣處理掉”。
接著，針對聯(lián)邦黨人國會在換屆前夜的立法，民主共和黨人控制的新國會針鋒相對，以牙還牙，于1802年3月8日通過了《1802年司法條例》（judiciary act of 1802），廢除了《1801年司法條例》中增設(shè)聯(lián)邦巡回法院的規(guī)定，砸了16位新任聯(lián)邦法官的飯碗。
不過，新國會并沒有撤銷任命42名治安法官的《哥倫比亞特區(qū)組織法》。為了防止聯(lián)邦黨人控制的最高法院挑戰(zhàn)新國會通過的法案，國會采取重新安排最高法院開庭日期的辦法，改一年兩次開庭為一次開庭，使最高法院從1801年12月到1803年2月期間暫時關(guān)閉，時間長達14個月之久。當最高法院再次開庭時，已經(jīng)是1803年2月了。
馬伯里雖然家財萬貫，但對治安法官這個七品芝麻官卻情有獨鐘，就這樣不明不白地丟失了法官職位，他覺得實在是太冤，非要討個說法不可。于是，馬伯里拉上另外三位同病相憐的難兄難弟，聘請曾任亞當斯總統(tǒng)內(nèi)閣總檢察長（attorney general，總檢察長一般譯為司法部長。這個職位雖然是1789年建立的，但當時只是一個非全職的內(nèi)閣職位，直到威廉·懷特任職期間才成為全職位置——即使這樣他仍然是光桿兒司令一個，因為司法部[Justice department]要到1870年才建立，只有到這時才可以稱司法部長）的查爾斯·李（Charles Lee）為律師，一張狀紙把國務(wù)卿麥迪遜告到了最高法院。他們要求最高法院下達執(zhí)行令（原文為拉丁文writ of mandamus，也譯訓令狀，在英美普通法中指有管轄權(quán)的法官對下級法院、政府官員、機構(gòu)、法人或個人下達的要求其履行法定職責行為的命令），命令麥迪遜按法律程序交出委任狀，以便自己能走馬上任。控方律師起訴的根據(jù)源自《1789年司法條例》（the judiciary act of 1789）第13款d條中的規(guī)定：聯(lián)邦最高法院在法律原則和慣例保證的案件中，有權(quán)向任何在合眾國的權(quán)威下被任命的法庭或公職官員（persons holding office）下達執(zhí)行令狀。
麥迪遜一看對手來頭不小，便來了個兵來將擋、旗鼓相當，請杰弗遜總統(tǒng)內(nèi)閣總檢察長萊維·林肯（Levi Lincoln）出任自己的辯護律師。這位林肯先生真不愧是現(xiàn)職總檢察長，辦案派頭十足，接了案子以后竟然連法院都懶得去，只是寫了一份書面爭辯送交最高法院，聲稱馬伯里訴麥迪遜（Marbury v. Madison）案是一個涉及黨派權(quán)力斗爭的政治問題，跟法律壓根兒就不沾邊，最高法院管不著這種根本就扯不清楚的黨派斗爭。
接到控方律師的起訴狀和辯方律師寄來的書面爭辯后，馬歇爾大法官以最高法院的名義致函國務(wù)卿麥迪遜，要求他解釋扣押委任狀的原因。誰料想，麥迪遜對馬歇爾的信函根本就不予理睬。在當時的法律和歷史環(huán)境下，麥迪遜這種目中無人、無法無天的行為是件稀松平常的事，因為聯(lián)邦最高法院當時實在是一個缺乏權(quán)威的司法機構(gòu)。制憲先賢漢密爾頓（Alexander Hamilton）曾評論說：“司法部門既無軍權(quán)，又無財權(quán)，不能支配社會力量與財富，不能采取任何主動行動”，是“分立的三權(quán)中最弱的一個”。1789年生效的美國憲法雖然規(guī)定了行政、立法、司法三權(quán)分立和制衡的格局，但這部憲法以及后來增添的憲法修正案，對于憲法最終解釋權(quán)的歸屬問題從未做出任何明確規(guī)定。這部憲法沒有賦予最高法院向最高行政當局和國家立法機構(gòu)指手畫腳、發(fā)號施令的特權(quán)，更別提強令總統(tǒng)、國務(wù)卿以及國會服從最高法院的判決了。
從憲政理論角度看，按照歐洲思想家洛克（John Locke）、孟德斯鳩（Charles Louis de Secondat Moutedquieu）、盧梭關(guān)于限權(quán)政府、分權(quán)制衡、主權(quán)在民的憲法和制度設(shè)計原則，行政權(quán)、立法權(quán)和司法權(quán)的職能和權(quán)限應(yīng)當嚴格區(qū)分，相互獨立，彼此之間“井水不犯河水”。另外，在分立的三權(quán)之中，如果一定要判定哪一權(quán)處于更優(yōu)越的地位，那顯然應(yīng)是擁有民意基礎(chǔ)的立法權(quán)，無論如何也輪不到非民選的司法部門占據(jù)至高無上、一錘定音的權(quán)威地位。
這樣，馬伯里訴麥迪遜一案實際上使馬歇爾大法官陷入了一種左右為難、必輸無疑的兩難困境。他當然可以正式簽發(fā)一項執(zhí)行令，命令麥迪遜按照法律程序發(fā)出委任狀。但麥迪遜有總統(tǒng)兼美軍總司令杰弗遜撐腰，他完全可能對最高法院下達的執(zhí)行令置若罔聞。既無錢又無劍的最高法院若向麥迪遜國務(wù)卿強行發(fā)號施令卻又被置之不理，只會讓世人笑掉大牙，進一步削弱最高法院的司法權(quán)威。可是，如果馬歇爾拒絕馬伯里合理的訴訟要求，那就等于主動認輸，承認最高法院缺乏權(quán)威，無法挑戰(zhàn)行政部門高官目無法紀的舉動，不僅愧對同一陣營中的聯(lián)邦黨人戰(zhàn)友，而且使最高法院顏面掃地。
審，還是不審，成為一個令馬歇爾極為頭疼的大難題。經(jīng)過半個多月的苦思冥想，他終于琢磨出了一個兩全其美的絕妙判決，令后人拍案稱奇，贊不絕口。馬歇爾的判決既表現(xiàn)出司法部門的獨有權(quán)威，又避免與行政當局和國會迎頭相撞、直接沖突，為確立司法審查（Judicial review）這個分權(quán)與制衡體制中的重要權(quán)力奠定了基石。
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